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Abstract
Purpose – Drawing on equity theory, social exchange theory and goal setting theory, the purpose of this paper
is to investigate the contingencies on the link between employees’ budgetary participation and their work
performance. Specifically, this study addresses the research questions: whether vertical information sharing and
budget goal commitment mediate the relationship between employees’ budgetary participation and their work
performance; and whether employees’ perceived budget fairness can strengthen the positive effects of
budgetary participation on vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment.
Design/methodology/approach – Survey data were collected from a sample of 556 low to middle level
managers of business organizations in Vietnam. The research model and its hypotheses were tested using
PLS-SEM. The standardized root mean squared residual value of the composite model was employed to
assess model fit. Common method bias was also checked using the marker-variable approach.
Findings – This study has two key findings: both vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment
partially mediate the positive effects of budgetary participation on work performance; and both dimensions of
perceived budget fairness (distributive and procedural) elevate the positive relationships of budgetary
participation – vertical information sharing and budgetary participation – budget goal commitment.
Practical implications – The findings could benefit businesses in Vietnam and similar market contexts.
Specifically, top management needs to select a proper level of budgetary participation that can facilitate
information sharing vertically within the organization and motivate their employees to be more committed to
achieve budget goals. Besides, the top management also needs to ensure that their employees perceive the
fairness in the budgeting process.
Originality/value – The study contributes a greater understanding as regards the mediating roles of
vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment as well as the moderating role of perceived budget
fairness on the relationship between employees’ participation in the budgetary process and their work
performance, especially in the context of an emerging market – Vietnam. Overall, this study contributes to the
management and accounting literature with insights concerning a more complex process explaining
employees’ work performance and triggered by their budgetary participation.
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1. Introduction
Over the past three decades, researchers have extensively examined whether employees’
involvement in and influence on their budgeting targets make them work more effectively.
Despite numerous research, there is lack of consensus theoretically and empirically on the link
between budgetary participation and work performance. There is empirical support for the
positive relationship between employees’ participation in budgeting and their work
performance in previous behavioral accounting studies (e.g. Brownell and McInnes, 1986;
Chong and Johnson, 2007; Dunk, 1989; Kren, 1992). Based on three meta-analyses, Bonache
et al. (2012) stated that, on the whole, the direct link between one’s participation in the
determining budgetary resources and their work performance in not significant. These
findings of meta-analyses did not mean to discount the importance of involving employee’s
involvement in budget decisions, but instead suggested that the link between budgetary
participation and work performance are contingent on intervening variables. Some
researchers drew on expectancy theory to argue that the relationship between budgetary
participation and work performance can be predicted through employees’ motivation factors
(Brownell and McInnes, 1986). Higher levels of budgetary participation are found to be
associated with more budget-based compensation, which in turn leads to higher firm
performance (Shields and Young, 1993). Another research stream has focused on the
intervening path through the cognitive benefits of the budget process in terms of information
sharing (Chong and Chong, 2002; Chong and Johnson, 2007). More recent studies have
examined the indirect effects of budgetary participation on work performance, operating
through psychological capital (Venkatesh and Blaskovich, 2012), job satisfaction and relevant
job information (Leach-López et al., 2007, 2009) and role ambiguity (Parker and Kyj, 2006).
While it appears that budgetary participation may generate a positive effect on work
performance when the proper mechanisms are employed, researchers have so far disagreed
on the intervening variables (Cheng, 2012). Therefore, this study attempts to contribute an
improved understanding on interventions that could be designed to explain or influence the
meaningful relationship between budgetary participation and work performance. More
specifically, this study extends the existent literature by examining vertical information
sharing and budget goal commitment as concurrently potential mediators that connect
budgetary participation to enhanced work performance. These two mediators, respectively,
capture cognitive-informational and motivational paths that were mostly examined
separately and independently in prior research. In integrating the two mediators in one
framework, the study provides insights into the relative roles of vertical information sharing
and budget goal commitment in impacting employees’ work performance. Furthermore, this
study also argues that employees’ perceived budget fairness may elevate the positive effects
of budgetary participation on vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment.
While some prior research into organizational justice or fairness examines perceived
fairness as a mediating invention (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Lau and Tan, 2006),
this study considers fairness could be ex post consequence that can modify the relationship
between employees’ budgetary participation and their behaviors. In this regard, using
equity theory and social exchange theory – where organizational justice theory is also
traced to – as empirical guide (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Greenberg, 1987), this study
proposes that the interaction between employees’ budgetary participation and their
perceived budget fairness relates to enhanced work performance through enhanced vertical
information sharing and budget goal commitment. In this sense, the higher employees
perceive the level of budget fairness, the more budgetary participation is related to vertical
information sharing and budget goal commitment. Drawing upon the goal setting theory
(Locke and Latham, 1990, 2002, 2006), this study also conjectures that a higher level of
budget goal commitment can result in better work performance. Moreover, this study





performance in the emerging markets. Many modern management theories have been
rooted from the West and subjected to criticism of limited relevance in developing markets
(Blunt and Jones, 1997). Much research into budgetary participation and perceived fairness
has been done in the context of Western markets (e.g. De Baerdemaeker and Bruggeman,
2015; Sholihin et al., 2011). Therefore, it has been argued that research is needed to explore
the application of theories in emerging market contexts (Blunt and Jones, 1997; Sheth, 2011).
Therefore, while the concepts used in this study may not be novel, an important implication
for this study lies with its insights from an emerging market context to maintain theoretical
and practice relevance of extant theories as well as prior findings in extant literature.
Vietnam was selected as the context of the study, but this is not a convenience choice.
Vietnam is a sizable, fast-growing market in Asia, once a centrally planned economy and in
the past decades has attracted considerable attention of foreign investment (World Bank,
2017). Therefore, Vietnam can be a meaningful context for examining the application of
modern management practices in driving employees’ performance.
Overall, this study research contributes to the accounting and management literature by
providing insights of the roles of budgetary participation as well as contingency factors
such as information sharing, budget goal commitment and perceived budget fairness in
inducing employee’s work performance, particularly with evidence from the context of an
emerging market – Vietnam.
2. Hypothesis development
2.1 Budgetary participation and work performance – the mediating role of vertical
information sharing
Budgetary participation is the degree to which managers influence over and engage in
setting the budgets of their subunits (Ezzamel, 1990; Kenis, 1979). It also refers to the
frequency and perceived influence of budget-related consultations between superiors and
subordinates (O’Connor et al., 2001). Budget participation is argued to serve an
informational function in that it drives employees to gather, exchange, disseminate and
communicate information that is relevant to the decision-making process to other
stakeholders in the organization (Nouri and Parker, 1998). The communications of
information between subordinates and superiors could be either upward or downward,
making up vertical information sharing (Parker and Kyj, 2006). Regarding upward
communication, some studies in the accounting discipline relied upon the agency theory
(Lambert, 2007) to suggest that employees often have more knowledge of their operational
areas than their superiors and their participation in budget decisions will enable them to
share those “private” knowledge with their superiors to negotiate realistic budget plans and
goals (Nouri and Parker, 1998; Parker and Kyj, 2006). High budgetary participation also
involves high frequency and broad scope of discussions between superiors and
subordinates about their budget issues (Milani, 1975; Murray, 1990). The frequency and
scope of such discussions allow more opportunities for subordinates to share their insights
with superiors. With respect to downward communication, budgetary participation enables
the sharing of information from the superiors to subordinates, in which superiors can
cascade the organization’s goals and expectations of subordinates, and at the same time
subordinates may obtain information regarding their own tasks and responsibilities. Hence,
it is expected that budgetary participation can enhance vertical information sharing,
including both upward and downward communications.
On the other hand, information sharing across members of the organizational hierarchy
involving in budget decisions is also argued to be beneficial to both employees and
organization (Parker and Kyj, 2006). At the individual level, both types of vertical
information sharing (upward and downward) can increase employees’ work performance in




subordinates (Murray, 1990) and ensuring that subordinates receive adequate budget
support (Nouri and Parker, 1998). Indeed, when employees participate in the determination
of budget resources, they will use their operational knowledge and insights to negotiate
budgetary goals and resources with their superiors, resulting in realistic budget plans with
better informed actions. The budgetary participation also gives the employees the chances
to understand the company’s strategies and expectations of them, so that they can perform
their tasks more effectively. As such, it can also be posited that vertical information sharing
can help enhance the employees’ work performance. Following prior meta-analyses in the
literature that the direct link between employee’s budgetary participation and their work
performance is not significant (Bonache et al., 2012), it can be expected that the employee’s
budgetary participation influences their work performance through the operation of vertical
information sharing across different organizational hierarchies. In this regard, budgetary
participation can foster vertical information sharing, which in turn enhances employees’
work performance. Thus, it can be hypothesized that:
H1. Vertical (upward and downward) information sharing positively mediates the
relationship between budgetary participation and work performance.
2.2 Budget participation and work performance – the mediating role of budget goal
commitment
Similarly, another mechanism intervening the budgetary participation – work performance
relationship is budget goal commitment. Budget goal commitment refers to the
determination to strive for a budget goal and the perseverance in pursuing the goal over
time (Locke et al., 1988). Regarding the participation – commitment relationship, previous
studies in management and organizational behavior (e.g. Locke et al., 1988; Rhodes and
Steers, 1981) have drew on goal setting theory to propose that employees’ participation in
decision making increases their goal commitment. An important notion of the goal setting
theory is that goals, which are human conscious intentions, regulate their subsequent
behaviors or actions (Locke and Latham, 2006). In this sense, when employees get involved
in the budgeting process, they could feel a sense of ownership of the budget and that
feelings of control can enhance their commitment to achieving budget goals. A statistically
significant association between budgetary participation and budget goal commitment is
also found in some accounting studies (e.g. Jermias and Yigit, 2012; Nouri and Parker, 1998;
Quirin et al., 2000). Moreover, within the context of Vietnam with a collectivist culture
(i.e. low individualism index) (Hofstede, 2017), employees tend to react positively to a high
budgetary participative environment because “decision making is shared among all
members of the society and subordinates are viewed as equal partners by the superiors”
( Jermias and Yigit, 2012, p. 36). Shields and Shields (1998) argued that the participation of
employees in the decision-making process can result in less resistance to changes and more
commitment to organizational decisions. Therefore, a positive relationship between
budgetary participation and budget goal commitment is expected.
The relationship between organizational commitment and employees’ work performance is
well established in previous studies in the areas of human resource management and
organizational behavior ( Jaramillo et al., 2005; Riketta, 2002). These studies theorize that a higher
level of employees’ commitment can result in higher motivation, which in turn, leads to higher
work performance. In the budget setting context, the relationship between budget goal
commitment and work performance can also be drawn upon the goal setting theory (Locke and
Latham, 1990, 2002, 2006). In accordance with this theory, once employees are committed to
budget goals, they will increase their efforts required to achieve those goals. This means
employees who are committed to their budget goals will try harder and persist over time,





Hence, the positive relationship between budget goal commitment and work performance is
expected. Some studies in the accounting discipline also provide empirical evidence that budget
goal commitment is positively linked to work performance (e.g. Chong and Chong, 2002; Kren,
1990; Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Nouri and Parker, 1998). Taking a similar line of reasoning in
Section 2.1, it can be expected that budgetary participation enhances budget goal commitment,
which in turn, enhances work performance. Thus, it can be hypothesized that:
H2. Budget goal commitment positively mediates the relationship between budgetary
participation and work performance.
2.3 From budgetary participation to vertical information sharing and budget goal
commitment – the moderating role of perceived budget fairness
While budgetary participation can be used as a motivational and informational measure to
enhance staff performance, the sharing of information or commitment to budget goals can
also be preceded by the perceptions of fairness of budget decisions made by their superiors
(Arnold, 2015). The organizational justice theory suggests that employees’ perceptions of
fairness of organizational behaviors impact their attitudes and behaviors within the
organization (Greenberg, 1987). Drawing on this theory, some researchers adopt the concept
of perceptions of budget fairness, which comprises two dimensions: distributive and
procedural fairness (Lau and Tan, 2006). The former concerns with the distribution of final
outcomes, while the latter taps into the processes that are used to deliver the outcomes
(Greenberg, 1987). The meta-analysis of Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) suggests
perceived justice serves as mediating intervention in the relationship between perceptions of
organizational outcomes/practices and outcomes such as job performance (Cohen-Charash
and Spector, 2001). In the same vein, the study of Lau and Tan (2006) also examines
procedural fairness as a mediator of the impact of budgetary participation on job tension
(Lau and Tan, 2006). In this sense, perceived fairness has been deemed as a mechanism
explaining the relationship between budgetary participation and outcomes.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the concept of justice is grounded in the equity
theory, which that is rooted from Adams (1965) and Blau’s (1964) social exchange theory. In
the budget setting literature, distributive fairness relates to the perceived fairness of the
resource allocation that an employee receives in relation to what others receive, while
procedural fairness concerns with the perceptions of fair enactment of budgeting procedures
(Maiga and Jacobs, 2007). In accordance with the equity theory and the social exchange
theory, employees may evaluate the exchange fairness of the relationship with the
organization by comparing the efforts they contributed (time, thinking, emotions, energy […] )
and the rewards they got (pay, support, respect, entitlements […] ) (Hur et al., 2014). Such
comparison is indeed the source of motivation for employees to adapt themselves in order to
equalize the differences (Elamin, 2012). For example, when the employees believe that they
receive unfair compensation, they can engage in harmful working behaviors (Hopkins and
Weathington, 2006). It is the aim of procedural justice to minimize conflicts by facilitating the
positive relationships between employees (Hur et al., 2014). Research has suggested that
employees are not only concerned with organizational inequality, but also the procedures for
achieving outcomes (Leventhal, 1980). Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) study found that the
employees’ participation in the decision-making processes would give them a sense of control.
As a result, if they perceive that they are treated fairly and that the evaluation process is
satisfactory, they will believe in proper and trustworthy final results. In this regard, even the
concepts of justice and fairness have been used interchangeably, they are ex ante provision
and ex post consequence aspects (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas, 2013). Therefore, it could be
deemed that the organization’s act of providing employees with the chance to participate in




sharing and performance; and then the perceived fairness varied through the ongoing
interactions with the structure could modify the employees’ attitude and behavior.
As such, this study draws upon Blau’s (1964) equity theory and social exchange theory in
arguing that when employees believe that the budgeting procedures are fair and the targets
are fairly distributed, they are more likely to share information during the budgeting
process and put more effort to commit to budget goals. On the other hand, employees who
believe that the budgeting process is unfair are less likely to disclose information (Parker
et al., 2014) and have lower commitment to budget goals. In this regard, when employees
believe that budgeting procedures are fair with a high level of procedure and distributive
justice, they will believe that the budget decisions are aligned with their rights and interests;
consequently, they are more likely to share their private information in the budgeting
process and more committed to set budget goals (Wentzel, 2002). In addition, a fair
budgeting environment can enhance interpersonal trust and reduce job tension (Lau and
Tan, 2006), creating a favorable condition for information sharing. Conversely, when the
budgeting system is unfair, employees feel disrespected and are inclined not to share
information (Parker et al., 2014) and they tend to express a low level of budget goal
commitment. As theorized in this study, a fair budgeting process signals respect for the
interests of the employees which encourage information sharing as well as their budget goal
commitment. On the other hand, an unfair budgeting process, such as a budgeting process
with favoritism, triggers negative behaviors (Hopkins and Weathington, 2006), demotivates
employees to share information and weakens their budget goal commitment (Parker et al.,
2014). Methodologically, mediation and moderation are not mutually exclusive, or in other
words, the consideration of an intervening variable as a mediator does not mean that
variable can never be examined as a moderator, provided that there is no multicollinearity
issue ( Jose, 2013). In light of these above reasoning, this study hypothesizes that when
employees perceive a higher level of budget fairness, the positive influences of budgetary
participation on vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment can be
strengthened. Thus, it can be hypothesized that:
H3a. Perceived budget distributive fairness positively moderates the relationship
between budgetary participation and vertical information sharing.
H3b. Perceived budget procedural fairness positively moderates the relationship
between budgetary participation and vertical information sharing.
H4a. Perceived budget distributive fairness positively moderates the relationship
between budgetary participation and budget goal commitment.
H4b. Perceived budget procedural fairness positively moderates the relationship
between budgetary participation and budget goal commitment.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed model that integrates the above discussed hypotheses.
3. Research methods
3.1 Sampling and data collection
This study was conducted in Vietnam – an emerging economy –with a data set of 556 mid- and
low-level managers in business firms. To include these specific informants in the sample,
a convenience-sampling approach was used to identify potential informants, and qualifying
questions were asked at the commencement of the survey to identify relevant informants.
The selection criteria included: being a mid- or low-level manager; having organizational tenure
of at least two years, and having at least two-year budgetary experience/responsibilities.
The informants represented various functional areas that are usually involved in budget





(e.g. human resources, information technology). These selection criteria ensured that the chosen
informants were knowledgeable about the budgeting issues in their respective organizations.
The authors distributed both e-mail and paper surveys to the target informants. The
sampling frame includes contacts from the authors’ LinkedIn connections. The initial list
included 15,363 potential e-mail contacts. The authors contacted the potential informants
via emails asking for their participation and then created a link to the survey on Survey
Monkey and the informants’ completion of the survey was considered as their consent of
participation. Following the procedure suggested by Brislin (1970), the original survey items
in English were translated into Vietnamese and back-translated by two academics who were
competent in both English and Vietnamese. To further ensure the face validity, the
translated Vietnamese questionnaire was also checked by managers and academics with
respect of items wording, relevancy and comprehensions. The final version of the survey
questionnaire was circulated to the potential informants via Survey Monkey, which is an
online survey administration tool. From May to December 2017, 1,435 responses were
received. After eliminating 360 that had no budget experience, 268 incomplete responses,
217 top-level managers and employees, and 34 responses that were done within less than
five minutes for completing the survey, the final sample included 556 responses.
LinkedIn is the most successful and comprehensive professional network (Mintz and
Currim, 2013). The use of LinkedIn to obtain the source of the target informants’ emails has
been applied in previous studies (e.g. Mintz and Currim, 2013; Ouakouak and Ouedraogo,
2017; Μichalena and Hills, 2016). To test the legitimacy of the sample, information on the
profiles of the 556 surveyed informants were examined. For the 115 LinkedIn members who
used company emails indicating affiliations, we found that there is no legitimacy problem.
For the 441 remaining LinkedIn members who used personal emails (e.g. Gmail or Yahoo),
we randomly selected 20 (5 percent of them) then used internet and telephone to check
various information on their profiles (e-mail, address, name, telephone number, company
name, department and job title) in term of existence. We found that no exception noted,
indicating no serious legitimacy issue of the final sample.
Table I shows the demographics of the participating firms and informants. The final
sample comprised 79.7 percent mid-level managers and 20.3 percent low-level managers.
All informants had a bachelor degree, and 29.1 percent had a master’s degree or above. The
informants’ average tenure (5.35 years) and budget experience (4.81 years) indicated that
they had adequate experience to respond to the survey and were knowledgeable about
budgeting issues. In relation to age, 81.7 percent of the informants were aged between 25
and 39. The informants worked in sales and marketing (43.2 percent), research and
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and other departments such as purchasing, human resource management, and information
technology (11.6 percent). In terms of firm characteristics, 50.9 percent of informants worked
in the service industry, 27.9 percent worked in manufacturing and 21.2 percent worked in
the trade industry. The sample well reflects the industrial structure of Vietnam in which the
services industry accounts for approximately 50 percent of GDP of Vietnam in 2015
followed by manufacturing at 33 percent (PwC, 2016).
The informants worked for foreign companies (70.7 percent) and local companies
(29.3 percent). In terms of firm size, 75.3 percent of informants worked in firms with total
assets of more than VND 100bn. In addition, 75.5 percent of informants worked in firms with
more than 100 full time equivalent employees. Given that the final response rate was low
(3.6 percent), the study followed Armstrong and Overton’s (1977) procedure to test
non-response bias. The independent t-tests revealed that there are no statistically significant
differences in all measures among the first (earliest) and fourth (latest) quartiles of
responses, indicating no non-response bias in this study.
3.2 Measurement scales and reliability and validity tests
This study adopts well-established scales in the existent literature to measure the variables
in the research model. The main variables measured in the questionnaire were budgetary
participation, perceived budget fairness, vertical information sharing, budget goal
commitment and work performance. Budgetary participation was measured following
previous studies (e.g. Milani, 1975; Nouri and Parker, 1998; Parker and Kyj, 2006). The scale
has six seven-point items. The respondents were asked to assess the degree of involvement
Demographics
Frequency




Male 364 65.5 Marketing 67 12.1
Female 192 34.5 Finance/accounting 67 12.1
Job position Research and development 91 16.4
Mid-level managers 443 79.7 Sales 173 31.1
Low-level managers 113 20.3 Manufacturing 93 16.7
Age Others 65 11.6
o25 14 2.5 Ownership structure
25–29 128 23.0 With foreign capital 393 70.7
30–34 160 28.8 Without foreign capital 163 29.3
35–39 166 29.9 Industry type
40–44 64 11.5 Manufacturing 155 27.9
W45 24 4.3 Trading 118 21.2
Academic qualifications Services 283 50.9
Undergraduate 394 70.9 Firm size (assets) in VND billion
Post-graduate 162 29.1 ⩽ 100 137 24.7
Organizational tenure 101–200 83 14.9
2–5 years 403 72.5 201–500 79 14.2
6–10 years 81 14.6 501–1,000 68 12.2
W10 years 72 12.9 W1,000 189 34.0
Budget experience Firm size (full time equivalent employees)
2–5 years 396 71.2 ⩽ 100 136 24.5
6–10 years 137 24.6 101–300 105 18.9












and influence that they have in the budgeting process with the scale ranging from 1¼ “very
little” to 7¼ “very much.” Perceived budget fairness was operationalized by budget
distributive fairness and budget procedural fairness. Budget distributive fairness was
measured using managers’ responses to five seven-point Likert items (Magner and Johnson,
1995; Wentzel, 2002). These items assess various comparative bases (needs, expectations
and what is deserved) that employees may use when judging the fairness of distributions as
well as the interpersonal facet of distributive fairness. Budget procedural fairness was
assessed using responses to eight procedural fairness statements following Magner and
Johnson (1995) and Wentzel (2002). These items measure the fairness of allocation
procedures (consistency across persons and time, accuracy, correctability, ethicality and
bias suppression) and the informational facet of procedural fairness. Vertical information
sharing is assessed via the scale of Parker and Kyj (2006). Budget goal commitment was
adapted from Chong and Chong (2002). This measure derives commitment levels by asking
directly about the goal. The scale ranges from 1¼ “strongly disagree” to 7¼ “strongly
agree.” Employees’ work performance was measured based on a widely accepted scale,
which was originally developed by Mahoney et al. (1963) and subsequently used by Hall
(2008), Kren (1992) and Lau and Roopnarain (2014). This study uses self-reports, or
subjective scores, to evaluate work performance because “a worker’s cognitive
representation and reports of his or her own” work performance “may be more subtle
than those of his or her supervisor, since a worker has much more information about the
historical, contextual, intentional and other backgrounds of his or her own work activities”
( Janssen, 2001, p. 192). Following previous studies (e.g. Janssen, 2001), this study
incorporates three demographic variables of the informants (age, academic qualifications
and organizational tenure) as control variables of work performance. See Table II for the
scales of the main constructs.
The measurement scales were first tested for reliability. Table II shows that the outer
loadings of all observed variables for all of the main constructs ranged between 0.60 and
0.90, which was higher than the desirable value of 0.50 (Hulland, 1999). All corresponding
t-bootstrap values were well above 1.96 to be statistically significant (ranged between 16.56
and 83.82). The average variance extracted (AVE) values of all latent variables were
acceptable because they were higher than 0.50 (ranged between 0.51 and 0.78). In addition,
the composite reliabilities of the latent variables ranged between 0.88 and 0.91. These results
indicate a high level of reliability of the measurement scales used in the model.
The discriminant validity of the measurements was evaluated following the procedure
proposed by Fornell and Larcker (1981). Table III shows that the square roots of the AVE of
the main constructs ranged between 0.72 and 0.89, which were well above the corresponding
bootstrapped correlations between these constructs (ranged between 0.10 and 0.70), thereby
indicating the discriminant validity of the measurements. In addition, discriminant validity
was demonstrated when the correlation between two constructs (the off-diagonal entries)
was not higher than their respective composite reliability (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
Table III indicates that no individual correlations (ranged between 0.10 and 0.70) were
higher than their respective composite reliabilities (ranged between 0.88 and 0.91), thereby
indicating a satisfactory discriminant validity. In addition, most of the correlations were
consistently smaller than the cut-off value of 0.70, suggesting acceptable discriminant
validity (Tabachnick et al., 2001). This study also employed the Heterotrait–Montrait
(HTMT) test, which is more stringent than that of Fornell and Larcker (1981), to evaluate
discriminant validity (Henseler et al., 2015). Table III shows that the HTMT values, which
were computed based on the bootstrapping routine, ranged between 0.12 and 0.79. These
values were significantly below 1.00, thereby discriminant validity was assumed to exist.
This study also examined the corresponding variance inflation factor (VIF) values of the







Budgetary participation (AVE¼ 0.57, CR¼ 0.89)
The portion of the budget I am involved in setting 0.78 34.88
The amount of reasoning provided to me by a superior when the budget is revised 0.68 22.99
The frequency of budget-related discussions with superiors initiated by me 0.76 32.85
The amount of influence I feel I have on the final budget 0.84 57.15
The importance of my contribution to the budget 0.82 48.72
The frequency of budget-related discussions initiated by my superior when budgets are being set 0.62 17.05
Budget goal commitment (AVE¼ 0.53; CR¼ 0.91)
I am strongly committed to pursuing the budget objectives 0.72 30.51
I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort beyond what I’d normally do to achieve the budget objectives 0.76 33.60
Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve the budget objectives or not (R) 0.78 32.31
There is not much to be gained by trying to achieve the budget objectives (R) 0.60 16.56
It is quite likely that the budget objectives may need to be revised, depending on how things go this quarter (R) 0.73 25.05
It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon the budget objectives (R) 0.75 30.41
It’s unrealistic for me to expect to reach the budget objectives (R) 0.71 28.17
Since it’s not always possible to tell how tough courses are until you’ve been in them a while, it’s hard to take
this goal seriously (R) 0.79 36.16
I think the budget objectives are a good goal to shoot for 0.68 19.65
Vertical information sharing (AVE¼ 0.78; CR¼ 0.88)
Through the budgeting process, I share my insights with my superior about the situation in my area
of responsibility 0.87 55.32
In the budgeting process, I communicate information to my superiors about opportunities and problems
facing the organization 0.90 77.18
Distributive fairness (AVE¼ 0.67; CR¼ 0.91)
My responsibility area received the budget that it deserved 0.81 45.18
The budget allocated to my responsibility area adequately reflects my needs 0.81 45.20
My responsibility area’s budget was what I expected it to be 0.87 83.82
I consider my responsibility area’s budget to be fair 0.79 40.79
My supervisor expresses concern and sensitivity when discussing budget restrictions placed on my area
of responsibility 0.82 46.09
Procedural fairness (AVE¼ 0.56, CR¼ 0.91)
Budgeting procedures are applied consistently across all responsibility areas 0.78 38.66
Budgeting procedures are applied consistently across time 0.77 40.92
Budgetary decisions for my area of responsibility are based on accurate information and well-informed opinions 0.72 29.72
The current budgeting procedures contain provisions that allow me to appeal the budget set for my area
of responsibility 0.73 32.77
The current budgeting procedures conform to my own standards of ethics and morality 0.76 40.22
Budgetary decision makers try hard not to favor one responsibility area over another 0.73 30.43
The current budgeting procedures adequately represent the concerns of all responsibility areas 0.75 32.31
Budgetary decisionmakers adequately explain how budget allocations formy responsibility area are determined 0.76 34.75
Work performance (AVE¼ 0.51; CR¼ 0.90)
Planning for my area of responsibility 0.71 27.12
Coordinating my area’s activities 0.74 35.50
Evaluating my subordinates’ activities 0.75 32.59
Investigating issues in my area of responsibility 0.79 41.20
Supervising staff 0.66 22.06
Obtaining and maintaining suitable staff 0.71 30.11
Negotiating 0.62 19.58
Representing the interests of my area of responsibility 0.75 38.29
Overall performance 0.71 27.76
Notes: AVE, average variance extracted; CR, Composite reliability; R, Reversed code
Table II.






VIF values for each relationship between the independent variables in the proposed model
were computed to detect potential multicollinearity. The results showed that the inner VIF
values ranged between 1.01 and 4.19, which were well below the threshold criterion of 10
(Hair et al., 2009), thereby indicating no multicollinearity problems in this study.
3.3 Analysis method choice
The partial least squares (PLS) method using SmartPLS3 was employed to analyze the data
and test the proposed model and hypotheses. Compared to the traditional covariance-based
structural equation model (SEM), PLS tends to achieve higher levels of statistical power
under equal conditions (Reinartz et al., 2009) because it is a non-parametric approach based
on ordinary least squares regression, and it is designed to maximize explained variance
(Ringle et al., 2015). Moreover, PLS does not require a large sample, and it estimates quite
precisely the parameters in the context of a small sample size (Reinartz et al., 2009).
A sample size of 556 greater than the required minimum sample size for robust PLS-SEM
estimations, which is suggested to be ten times of path relationships in the testing model
(Barclay et al., 1995). Finally, PLS assists researchers to analyze the measurement model
simultaneously with the structural model with both moderating and mediating relationships
(Lee et al., 2011). PLS is also a widely accepted statistical technique adopted in recent
management accounting studies (Lau and Roopnarain, 2014; Nitzl, 2016).
4. Hypotheses testing results
To test the hypotheses in the proposed theoretical model, the strength and statistical
significance of structural paths were examined. Table IV indicates 5 models, providing the
results of the predictive relevance of the structural paths in terms of β coefficients and
t-values, and the adjusted R2 for endogenous constructs. The bootstrapping procedure was
used with 500 times. The adjusted R2 values for all predicted variables (vertical information
sharing¼ 0.52; budget goal commitment¼ 0.56; and work performance ⩾ 0.25) were greater
than the recommended level of 0.10 (Falk and Miller, 1992), indicating that the variances of
the dependent variables can be measured within the desirable level.
H1 conjectured that vertical information sharing would partially mediate the
relationship between budgetary participation and work performance. This hypothesis
was confirmed because the β coefficient for the path between budgetary participation and
vertical information sharing was 0.39 and significant at the 1 percent level (t¼ 9.22)
(see Model 1), and the β coefficient of the path between vertical information sharing and
Mean SD 1____ 2____ 3____ 4____ 5____ 6____
1. Budgetary
participation 4.79 1.14 0.75
2. Vertical
information
sharing 5.55 1.18 0.44** (0.56) 0.89
3. Budget goal
commitment 5.80 0.87 0.42** (0.49) 0.58** (0.72) 0.72
4. Distributive
fairness 4.46 1.48 0.12** (0.15) 0.40** (0.50) 0.50** (0.57) 0.82
5. Procedural
fairness 4.59 1.40 0.10** (0.12) 0.35** (0.44) 0.51** (0.57) 0.70** (0.79) 0.75
6. Work
performance 5.70 0.75 0.34** (0.40) 0.42** (0.53) 0.48** (0.56) 0.27** (0.31) 0.27** (0.31) 0.72
Notes: 1st value¼Correlation between variables (off diagonal); 2nd value (italics)¼HTMT ratio; Square root








work performance was 0.21 and significant at the 1 percent level (t¼ 4.39) (see Model 3).
H2 posited that budget goal commitment has a positive mediating effect on the relationship
between budgetary participation and work performance. This hypothesis was supported
because the β coefficient for the path between budgetary participation and budget goal
commitment was 0.37 and significant at the 1 percent level (t¼ 9.02) (see Model 1); and the
β coefficient of the path between budget goal commitment and work performance was 0.39
and significant at the 1 percent level (t¼ 7.69) (see Model 3).
In addition, this study employed the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) Sobel approach to test the
mediating H1 and H2. The direct effect of budgetary participation on work performance in
the proposed model is positive and significant (β¼ 0.12, t¼ 2.91) (see Model 3). However,
when vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment were removed from the
proposed model and did not act as mediating variables, this direct effect became stronger
(β¼ 0.37, t¼ 10.07). The increase in significant direct effect indicates evidence of partial
mediation (Kline, 2015). Thus, both vertical information sharing (IF) and budget goal
commitment (COMMIT) partially mediate the relationship between budgetary participation
(PAR) and work performance, thereby supporting H1 and H2.
This study further employed the Sobel test following the suggestion of Preacher and
Hayes (2004) for a robustness check ofH1 andH2. It used a bootstrap technique using SPSS
22.0 with the Process Macro add-in and computed the correlations between the dependent
and independent variables with their corresponding confidence intervals (Preacher and
Hayes, 2004). The results indicated that when vertical information sharing was included as
the mediating variable, the correlation of the indirect effect of budgetary participation on
work performance was 0.10 ( po0.05; confidence intervals ranged between 0.07 and 0.13),
Sobel statistics¼ 6.48 ( po0.01). Moreover, when budget goal commitment was added as
the mediating variable, the indirect effect of budgetary participation on work performance
had the correlation of 0.12 ( po0.05; confidence intervals ranged between 0.08 and 0.16
(see Model 2), Sobel statistics¼ 7.49 ( po0.01). Thus, both vertical information sharing and
budget goal commitment partially mediate the effect of budgetary participation on work
performance, thereby supporting H1 and H2.
H3a–H4b posit that distributive budget fairness and procedural budget fairness positively
moderate the PAR-IF and PAR-COMMIT relationships. In other words, when employees
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IF COMMIT WP WP WP
Dependent variable β t-value β t-value β t-value β t-value β t-value
Hypothesis Independent variable
H1, H2 PAR 0.39 9.22*** 0.37 9.02*** 0.12 2.91*** 0.24 6.18*** 0.18 4.35***
DF 0.44 8.02*** 0.35 7.41*** 0.08 1.10 0.05 0.71
PF 0.30 5.15*** 0.49 11.67*** 0.17 2.57** 0.04 0.58
H3a, H4a DF×PAR 0.07 0.83 0.26 3.93*** 0.03 0.29 (0.08) 1.07
H3b, H4b PF×PAR 0.38 5.06*** 0.13 2.29** 0.05 0.42 0.09 1.06
H1 IF 0.21 4.39*** 0.23 3.36***
H2 COMMIT 0.39 7.69*** 0.40 5.72***
Control variable
Age 0.09 2.43** 0.07 1.87 0.06 1.61
Qualifications 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.11 (0.01) 0.34
Tenure 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.48
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.56 0.29 0.25 0.29
Notes: PAR, Budgetary participation; DF, Distributive fairness; PF, Procedural fairness; IF, Vertical
information sharing; COMMIT, Budget goal commitment; WP, Work performance. *,**,***Denote









perceive higher levels of distributive budget fairness and procedural budget fairness, the
strengths of the PAR-IF and PAR-COMMIT relationships would be stronger. To test these
hypotheses, this study creates two interaction terms DF×PAR and PF×PAR after mean
centering the moderating variable (distributive budget fairness and procedural budget fairness)
and the independent variable (budgetary participation) that constitute the interaction terms in
order to mitigate potential multicollinearity (Aiken et al., 1991). The PLS results for the
theoretical model show that the β coefficient of the relationship between the interaction term
DF×PAR and IF is insignificant (β¼ 0.07, t¼ 0.83) (see Model 1), and thus reject H3a.
However, Models 1 and 2 show that three remaining β coefficients of the three interaction terms
DF×PAR and PF×PAR (that linked to vertical information sharing (IF) and budget goal
commitment (COMMIT)) had t-values ranged between 2.29 (significant at the 10 percent level)
and 5.06 (significant at the 1 percent level). Therefore, H3b, H4a and H4b were supported.
Moreover, we ran models 4 and 5 to further check the potential direct effects of all the
independent variables, including the interaction terms DF×PAR and PF×PAR, on work
performance. We found that budget participation, vertical information sharing and budget
goal commitment directly influence work performance (β coefficients ranged between 0.18
and 0.40; t-values ranged between 3.36 and 6.18), in supporting H1 and H2. Models 4 and 5
reveal that except procedural fairness, the remaining variables distributive fairness and the
interaction terms DF×PAR and PF×PAR do not significantly and directly affect work
performance. However, these variables indirectly influence work performance via
information sharing and budget goal commitment (see Models 1 and 2), supporting the
mediating hypotheses H1 and H2.
4.1 Model fit and common method bias
The standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) value of the composite model was also
examined using SmartPLS3 to test the model fit. The SRMR of 0.043 was lower than the
recommended value of 0.08, indicating an acceptable model fit (Henseler et al., 2016). As cross-
sectional data are collected using a single-informant approach, there might be common
method bias effects that lead to spurious relationships among the variables (Podsakoff et al.,
2003). The marker-variable technique recommended by Lindell and Whitney (2001) was
employed to test common method bias. This technique can detect common method bias by
including “a measure of the assumed source of method variance as a covariate in the statistical
analysis” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 889). In particular, we selected the item “do you want to go
overseas for this year National holiday?” which has no theoretical relevance to any variables
in the proposed model, as a marker variable to control for common method bias. The mean
change in correlations of the key constructs (rU−rA) when partialling out the effect of rM is
insignificant at 0.02, providing evidence of no common method bias in this study.
5. Implications and limitations
5.1 Implications
This study contributes to the management and accounting literature in general and
specifically budget participation literature in the following ways. First, the key premise of
this study is that this positive effect of budgetary participation on work performance is
partially mediated by employees’ vertical information sharing and budget goal
commitment. This study integrates that both vertical information sharing and budget
goal commitment act as intervening mechanisms in the budgetary participation – work
performance relationship. Diverging with some studies such as Bonache et al. (2012), this
study found that the direct effect of budgetary participation on work performance
persists. A possible interpretation of the finding is that, apart from the motivational




improvement measures proposed by the participating employee and consequently
enhance their performance. Another possible explanation could be the cultural context of
this study. Vietnam is an Asian collectivist culture that is transitioning to the market
economy. In the past, decisions could often be collectively made and one’s performance
could often be subsumed under organizational results. Therefore, it may be possible that
employees in Vietnam attribute their performance directly to the participation in the
collective decision making. There could be a possibility, though plausible, that other
variables also operate in a similar manner just as vertical information sharing and budget
goal commitment. While vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment may
also be related in that the information sharing can help employees understand the goals
better and thereby be more committed to goal achievement or the commitment to goals
makes employees feel more compelled to information sharing. Nonetheless, this paper
focused on understanding the relative role of each mediating intervention (vertical
information sharing or budget goal commitment), controlling the effect of the other.
Methodologically, direct associations between either concepts and work performance need
to be established prior to the assessment of one as a mediator in the relationship between
the other and work performance.
Second, this study enriches the budgetary participation literature by investigating the
employees’ perceived budget fairness as a contingency factor of the budget participation –
vertical information sharing and budget participation – goal commitment relationships.
Given that the moderated mediation mechanism arguably can make the budgetary
participation environment more effective, this study further examined the interaction
effects between employees’ perceived budget fairness (the moderator) and budget
participation on their vertical information sharing and budget goal commitment
(the mediators), which in turn impact subsequent work performance. In doing so, the
study adds to extant literature from the motivational and cognitive/informational
perspectives examining the paths between budgetary participation – performance
relationship (e.g. Chong and Johnson, 2007; Parker and Kyj, 2006; Shields and Shields,
1998; Venkatesh and Blaskovich, 2012) by introducing perceived budget fairness as a
moderator on these paths. The study found that both distributive fairness and procedural
fairness have positive moderating effects on the budgetary participation – vertical
information sharing and budgetary participation – budget goal commitment linkages.
This is an important finding as prior studies in this line of research mostly focused on
linear effects of budget participation and intervening variables on work performance.
Overall, this study contributes to the management and accounting literature by testing a
more complex model of budgetary participation and work performance.
Furthermore, the study also leads to some practical implications. The findings of the
study highlight the importance of promoting employees’ budgetary participation as a
vehicle to foster employees’ vertical information sharing and their budget goal commitment
toward enhancing managerial performance. The superiors need to select a proper level of
budgetary participation that can facilitate vertical information sharing and motivate
employees to be committed to achieve budget goals. Besides, the result relating to the
interaction effects between budgetary participation and perceived budget fairness may
assist top management understand the importance of ensuring budget fairness in the
budgeting process. Organizations need to pay attention to employees’ perceived budget
fairness as a potentially effective mechanism in managing the organizational budgeting
process toward enhanced performance effectiveness.
5.2 Limitations of this study
As with any study, this research is subject to some limitations that should be considered in





survey, which has limitation in making causal inferences or examining the process
underlying the interrelationships between concepts (e.g. mediating variables in this
research) (Rindfleisch et al., 2008; Rong and Wilkinson, 2011). A longitudinal design in
future research could address this shortfall. Second, although procedural and statistical
measures have been taken to mitigate the potential common method variance issue, the
survey data in this research rely on self-report of respondents. Future research may need to
consider triangulation of data sources, e.g., data of actual work performance of employees.
Finally, this research was conducted in just one emerging market context that is Vietnam.
Future research may need to attempt to collect data from other emerging markets as well as
developed markets to increase the generalizability of the findings.
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